Communications session 1

Pragmatism, Belief and Truth

Ian Salles Botti |UFSC, Brazil

Virtue Epistemology as a Theory of Investigation

This communication is about the theoretical function of the concept of epistemic virtue in epistemology in Christopher Hookway's perspective, which is heavily inspired by Peirce's pragmatism. The main theme is a metaepistemological one, given that it's not an direct answer to some epistemological problem such as traditionally conceived by analytic epistemology. Rather, it's a proposal of reorientation of the discipline and its terminology, implying new ways of dealing with traditional issues and new issues to be dealt with. In Hookway's responsibilist virtue epistemology the customary focus on the theories of knowledge and justification is replaced by the theory of investigation, in which epistemic virtues play a central role in the regulation of epistemic activities, in overcoming the dichotomy between internalism and externalism, and in answering skepticism. The notion of epistemic virtue has been originally employed in contemporary epistemology as an attempt to resolve traditional problems regarding knowledge and justification, like, for instance, Gettier cases and Agripa's trilemma. Whether or not these attempts succeeded is an open question. One of the most common objections is that it's inadequate to understand the concepts of knowledge and justification in terms of intellectual virtues, that is, whatever might be the importance of the virtues to the justification of beliefs and the acquisition of knowledge, they are not a component of the analysis of either concept - they are not among the necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief to qualify as justified or knowledge. The notion of epistemic virtue in use here is one that isn't limited to basic cognitive faculties, it also includes patterns of reasoning, skills and epistemic character traits. Considering that for it to be called VIRTUE epistemology it must give explanatory primacy to the virtues, the critics of virtue epistemology defend that the role of the virtues is merely auxiliary and secondary, so that their theoretical utility in dealing with the above-mentioned problems is denied, Consequently, it is denied that the virtues might have an important role in the core issues of epistemology. Hookway's proposal consists in a defense of the centrality of epistemic virtues in the regulation of epistemic activities and a rejection of the concepts of knowledge and justification as starting points in epistemology. He acknowledges that the relation between virtues and beliefs is indirect, but, against mainstream analytic epistemology, he denies that this is the only way in which the virtues could have a central role in epistemology. Understood in generic terms, epistemology is concerned with our practices of epistemic evaluation, this characterization leaves open (i) whether beliefs are the main object of evaluation, and (ii) if justification and knowledge are the main terms of epistemic evaluation. Alternatively to this orthodox choice of object of study and vocabulary, it is possible that (iii) activities such as investigations and deliberations might be the main object of evaluation and that (iv) virtues might be necessary to epistemically evaluate such activities as good, efficient, responsible and so on. Therefore, virtue epistemology as conceived by Hookway gives pride of place to the theory of investigation, opposed to the theories of knowledge and justification, bringing about new ways of interpreting debates such as internalism versus externalism, and of answering problems such as skepticism. Also, it motivates epistemology to concern itself with the study of particular epistemic virtues and vices, and with the study of a diversity of epistemic activities, not only at an individual level, but also at a social level.
 
 

Marcos Antonio Alves |Unesp - Marília, Brazil

Information, Cognition, Fake News ans its Relations with Action from Fred Dretske

Based on information and on their cognitive capacity, through their actions, human beings erect and destroy beautiful things. What are the conections between information and cognition and their influence on the direction of action, especially that which is morally responsible, ie, free and conscious? How to explain, especially in times of Big Data, so many actions based on fake news, on disinformation? In this work we investigate questions like these from the relation between information, cognition, in particular, knowledge, and fake news, adopting, as a conceptual basis, Fred Dretske's approach. For him, knowledge is true belief causally supported by information, capable of directing action. On the one hand, we expose the notion of information, the definition of knowledge and its influence on behavior as suggested by the aforementioned thinker. On the other hand, we aim at an explanatory approach to the influence of fake news on human action, suggesting a conception of this news, evaluating its relations with information and cognition. We seek to emphasize the importance of action based on knowledge, trying to avoid the influence of unfounded beliefs, supported by fake news.

Rodrigo Azevedo dos Santos Gouvea | UFRJ, Brazil

Beliefs as Expectations

Beliefs are mental states that represent the way things are. Beliefs are true if they agree with how things are. Otherwise, they are false. Besides distinguishing themselves from other mental states by means of this representational character, beliefs play an important practical role. They figure amongst the elements that determine the course of our actions. Beliefs guide us through forms of action that will supposedly satisfy our desires. In general, expectations are about future experiences, and reveal themselves, most commonly, in our surprise when facing recalcitrant experiences. Expectations do not need to represent how things are. They may represent the way in which we experience things, or they may not represent anything at all, as argued by some recent proponents of enactivism (cf. Hutto & Myin 2017, p. 71). However, it seems undisputed that expectations have practical relevance. In interpreting the notions of belief presented by C. S. Peirce (1986 [1877] & 1986 [1878]) and F. P. Ramsey (1990 [1926], 1990 [1927], & 1990 [1929]), C. Misak (2004 [1991]) & 2017) argued that beliefs are constituted by sets of expectations. It is not clear whether Misak holds that there are identity relations between beliefs and expectations, or if she takes these things to be different in spite of the putative constitutive relation. Nonetheless, Misak explicitly endorses the view that beliefs guide our actions by means of “habits of expectation”, which are confirmed or frustrated by our experiences. The main goal of my talk is to reflect on, and increase the plausibility of the claim that beliefs are expectations. In order to do so, I will clarify and determine a specific thesis that the claim may express by demarcating the concepts and elucidating the way in which we should understand the putative identity relation. Besides, I intend to respond to possible objections to the referred thesis. Some of these objections derive from the difficulty of conceiving certain kinds of beliefs (such as, e.g., conscious beliefs, beliefs about past events and general beliefs) as expectations.

Francisco Newton Freitas | UFPI, Brazil

A Synthesis of Important Conceptual Core Used in the Elaboration of the Pragmaticist Epistemology in the Face of the Classical Peircean Doctrine

The objective of communication to present, in general terms, important conceptual core used in the elaboration of Pragmaticist Epistemology (PE), in the framework of the peircean classical doctrine, in synthesis, based only on the essays "The fixation of belief" (1877) and "How to make our ideas clear" (1878). To this end, the following points were redesigned: (i) the nature of scientific research and the methods of belief fixation; and, (ii) pragmatic maxim and its remodeling and indications to clarify ideas, as contributions to the elaboration of some philosophical reflections. Methodologically, the reading and registration of the afore mentioned texts was processed, identified their main conceptual core and elaborated a synthesis of their characteristics, in the form of philosophical investigation, at the level of Theoretical Framework, after the exercise of thematic framework. In Final Considerations on Peircean Classical Philosophy: (a) the importance and timeliness of his contributions to the formation of a critical doctrine was observed, experienced and autonomous, especially from the point of view of PE, in the sense of going through the plot and logical organization, aiming to understand the reality of the human and the world, stimulating the individual to "fix beliefs" (methods) and to "clarify ideas" (indications) and to perceive their own "creativity" as the result of permanent clashes in search of truth based on the logical balance of a scientific mentality; (b) it is original and it was constructed from the idea of experience, doubt, habit, law, belief and clarity, among other conceptual core, which, in turn, provoke in mind the need for actions to solve, acting on the process of fixing beliefs and clarifying ideas, as antidotes to doubt, and as a rule of action (belief, habit and law), and expands this idea in order to highlight the importance of the scientific method as a more effective forwarding to the fixation of knowledge; (c) introduced himself program based on the duty of construction of the ideal for the exercise of learning to think/ reason in a broad and profound way; (d) conceptual core are distinguished at the same time that it relates them in complementarities in their elaboration; (e) the 'scientific method' is presented as the main one in the light of PE; and, finally, (f) by its depth, one sees the Peircean influence on American thought, reaching logical operationalism and contemporary currents of the Philosophy of Science, for example.

Larissa Ferreira Gonzales; Edna Maria Magalhães Nascimento | UFPI, Brazil

Research on the Theory of Truth in Charles Sanders Peirce

The present research is entitled “Research on the theory of truth in Charles Sanders Peirce”. It is an ongoing work linked to the Graduate Program in Philosophy at UFPI. The main objective of the research is to analyze Peirce's pragmatist philosophy in order to understand his theory of truth and identify it as the main theoretical axis that justifies the unity of the pioneer pragmatist's writings. Based on this objective, we seek to characterize the peculiar type of philosophy practiced by the philosopher that led him to call it pragmaticism. The research aims at explaining Percean's theory of truth, above all Peirce's anti-cartesianism and his objection to modern epistemology with its reductionist dualisms, such as subject and object, reason and sensitivity, theory and practice, facts and values, etc., which it has difficult to understand human problems in their complexity. Another category of analysis is fallibilism, it can be said that it is a way of recognizing an inherent characteristic of knowledge, as the search for undoubted and absolute certainty can be understood as a deviation from reason, being something impossible in the face of experience and plurality. Therefore, pragmatists like Peirce do not renounce the truth, but aspire to discover it, forge it, submitting their formulations to experience and discussion in the scientific community. In this sense, Percean's theory of pragmatic truth needs to be understood through the notions of knowledge, reality and beliefs. From this study, we will enter both Peirce's phenomenology and semiotics in order to understand, respectively, the notions of firstness, secondness and thirdness and the meaning of fundamental propositions to investigate the theory of truth. of belief (1877) and How to make our ideas clear (1878), which are emblematic of the tradition, the works that were organized in the book Collected Papers (1934). Texts from the philosophical tradition will be added that will help to clarify the research problematic, the intellectual scene of the context approached by the pragmatist, as well as texts by commentators and interpreters who discuss the theory of beliefs, phenomenology and the theory of truth in Peirce. The discussion of the theory of truth in Peirce's work has been revisited by contemporary authors in the field of epistemology, highlighting the philosophical value of the classical pragmatist's work and its relevance in the contemporary debate. As a result, it is understood that the pragmatist method allows us to show how we can reach true conclusions in the investigation and clarify concepts such as reality or probability. In this sense, Peirce argues that a theory tuned to experience would make it possible to resolve conceptual confusions related to practical meanings and consequences. Thus, it implies the successful use of the method of science to philosophical questions, so that we can say that there is nothing unknowable that it is not possible to establish by applying the method of science. These problems are recurrent themes of contemporary epistemology, whose nature of discussions focuses on themes related to the criteria for justifying knowledge and formulations that can authoritatively confront the provocations of skepticism, while finding reasonable solutions to overcome foundationalist theories or knowledge objectivists. The present work will be carried out through bibliographical research, which will approach the philosophical text as an argumentative piece. The method used will be hermeneutic, based on this methodological orientation, the analysis and structure of the researched texts will be carried out, which will point to the following hermeneutic conjecture: a) characterization of Peirce's theory of beliefs; b) understanding of its phenomenological approach; c) Investigation of the concept of reality to elucidate Peirce's theory of truth and d) articulation between Peirce's main theses and the theory of truth.

José Luis de Barros Guimarães; Heraldo Aparecido Silva | UFPI, Brazil

Experience, Experience and Life Wisdom: Walter Benjamin and the Pragmatist Dimension of his Narrative Theory

Contemporary epistemological reflections that have the philosophical thought of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) as a central theoretical framework usually develop the idealistic-romantic aspect, present in his youth writings, as well as the materialist-historical-dialectic dimension of his reflections. about life, from its encounter with Marxism. Although the aforementioned epistemological currents can be considered striking colors in the general framework of his philosophy, we believe it is possible to find pragmatist tones in his gnosiology based on the interchangeable relationship proposed by the author between experience, narrative and practical life wisdom. We intend to show that, for Benjamin, the epistemological paradigm of modern capitalist society, in addition to not being sufficient to explain countless other dimensions of human life that are not the object of investigation of the modern epistemic paradigm, end up disconnecting the knowledge of the world from the complex phenomenon of life. . Experiences (Erfahrung), considered here in an integral and communitarian sense, are gradually replaced by experiences (Erlebnis), understood here in a fragmented and individualized sense. It then becomes necessary to think about a broader concept of experience that allows us to reconnect knowledge with the concrete dimension of life. And Benjamin's reflection centered on the categories of experience, experience, narrative and wisdom in life can serve as a key for us to think about the formulation of a broader epistemological paradigm, which recognizes other types of experiences as a form of knowledge for life in a pragmatic perspective . The central theoretical framework used was Walter Benjamin's two youth texts, Experience and About the Philosophy Program of the Future, published between the 10-20's, as well as two famous writings of maturity by the thinker, respectively entitled Experience and poverty and The narrator: considerations about the work of Nicolai Leskov, published between the 30's and 40's. Based on the reflections presented by the author above mentioned writings, we intend to explain the pragmatist dimension of narratology developed by the German philosopher



Communications session 2

Aesthetics and Semiotics of Art

Gihad Abdalla El Khouri | FTEC-Curitiba, Brazil

Unpredictable Architectures Through Rajchman's New Pragmatism

John Rajchman, an American philosopher, makes architecture, art, and urbanism central figures in his thinking from which he composes creative and connecting spaces. In this context, in 1998, he produced his book Constructions, in which he presented the maturation and connection between several thoughts developed in previous years, proposing a complex architectural-philosophical, creative, and proposing new possible paths to the discipline. Last year he presented the essay “A New Pragmatism?” at the Anyhow conference. which would be published the following year, in which, exploring from Kant to Foucault, it evokes what was pragmatism and opens to new possibilities of the thought system, making it capable of containing contemporary life, in its multiple agencies and lines of forces that escape control and programmatic determinations, in a Deleuzian approach. In this way, the philosopher allows the field to establish unpredictable, non-programmable architectures that establish more complex and deeper relationships with reality, re-singularizing environments in contrast to pre-established determinations that end up subjecting architecture to simplifications and generalities. Thus, the philosopher hopes, to promote a pragmatism of creation and resistance to the present, unlike communicational or informational pragmatism. Thus, this communication proposes a theoretical-explanatory investigation on the philosophical architecture carried out by Rajchman through his proposal for a new pragmatism, based on the ideas of diagram and diagnosis, in connection with the other architectonic thoughts of the philosopher, presented in " Constructions”, his most mature text, seeking to unveil unpredictable architectures in the expansion and exploration of possible paths to architectural practice and theory.

Gabriela LM Moreira; Eluiza B. Ghizzi | UFMS, Brazil

Rethinking the Element of Reason in the Aesthetics of Architecture: Contributions from Charles Sanders Peirce's Pragmatist Philosophy

Modern architecture is widely accepted to have caused a radical change in the course of architectural and urban history, just as an equally destabilizing effect to the profession when some of its deeply rooted beliefs were shown to fail the test of experience, marking a period of crisis, doubts and investigative action which echoes even until current days. Organized around a discourse of breaking with tradition, based on technical innovation made possible by the advances of science and technology at the beginning of the 20th century, modern architectural production found new formal expression in the attempt to respond to urban problems then emerging. Among these, minimalist and functionalist perspectives became signs of architectural rationality, characterized by resorting to formal abstraction and by the emphasis on the functional organization of space, alluding to the economy and efficiency of the industrial machine. Despite its avant-garde orientation, modern rationalism can be understood as updating an aesthetic inclination towards reason that dates back to Classical Antiquity, as it does not contest the principles of proportion, harmony and symmetry, which make up a set of recurrent rational values used as stylistic and typological guidelines for architectural design in different historical periods. In addition, this inclination finds continuity in contemporary architecture, such as in the influences received from linguistic structuralism, cybernetics and, more recently, the use of diagramming software, with the assimilation of digital technologies in the design process. In contemporary architecture, however, this inclination must coexist with the criticism imposed on rationalist approaches, from the 1960s onwards, according to which they were considered to have disregarded the dimension of experience and the complexity of phenomena. Concepts such as form, abstraction and even science were questioned within the field of architecture. During the same period, there was also a greater approximation between art and architecture, not only converging to the purpose of mediating experiences, to the detriment of creating objects (SCHULZ-DORNBURG, 2002), but also with regard to the questioning of their disciplinary boundaries (VIDLER, 2013). Charles Sanders Peirce's (1839-1914) pragmatist philosophy allows us to reconsider the element of reason in architecture, without implicating the limitations attributed to rationalism or to a mechanistic conception of phenomena. To this end, we highlight the phenomenological basis of Peircean philosophical architecture, given that its sequential classification of the three universal categories of experience underlies the subdivision and interdependence between the normative sciences – aesthetics, ethics and logic, or semiotics –, which must be understood in their close relationship with the pragmatist ideal of furthering the development of concrete reasonableness. As a normative science, aesthetics comprises the critical formation of habits of feeling in the definition of an ideal that guides conduct and thought (CP 1.574). Reasonableness, in turn, is not to be confused with an exclusivist reason, as it consists of a rationality that incorporates feeling and action (SANTAELLA, 2017). In this system, it is admitted that not only there must be something aesthetic in science, but the aesthetic quality of art itself seems to involve a reasonable feeling, which can be understood based on its materialized form in the world (CP 5.113; SANTAELLA, 2017). Furthermore, the advantage of reason, or what determines it, is, for Peirce, self-control in the (self-)criticism of thought (DE WAAL, 2007), distinguishing the evolutionary trait of the mind in the capacity to learn from experience and change its habits (IBRI, 2015). We propose, based on pragmatism, to rethink the element of reason in relation to the aesthetic dimension of architecture, considering the conceptual opening to the temporality of signification that unfolds in the dialogue between thought and experience, motivating the evolution of this field of knowledge.

Luiz Fernando de Biazi Seba| PUC-SP, Brazil

Another Possibility for the Epistemology of Architecture

This essay aims to investigate, in the light of the idea of a double face of habits (IBRI), how the concept of functionalization changes through time and how it appears in two epistemological models that are presented in the book Primitive Future (2018) by architect Sou Fujimoto. The metaphors of nest and cave contrast themselves as possible means of designing, thinking, using, and communicating the space. The nest metaphor is born as a legacy of the first industrial revolution and its consequent change in production speed. From manufacturing to machinery, the method of reproduction of capital is altered. In the face of the new social agendas of culture and the globalized and digitally connected world, we see the need for a project that goes against the reproductive logic that dominates our cities since the industrial revolution and still seems to reign over the contemporary city. The cave model is born as a possible revision of the idea of form-follow-function, the maximum slogan of architectural modernism that aimed to build model-houses for model-bodies. Open to the most varied possibilities of use of space, the dwelling of the primitive future shows itself more and more complex as the body apprehends the space with its senses. It becomes necessary to interpret these signs apprehended in the concave or convex forms, in the pleasant or not temperature, in the textures that instigate or repel our touch and that generate varied forms of use. One of the models seems able to decrease the expenditure of mental energy, while the other seems to make the mind work always in high energy. By understanding the concept of functionalism as thirdness that inhibits/stimulates the creative process of firstness in works of architecture, connects the field of architectural studies to pragmatism and semiotics of Peirce, demonstrating once again that, every day, the sciences show themselves more undisciplinary and resonant (FERRARA). The double face of habits reaffirms itself in different ways of thinking architecture and space.

Silvana Borges da Silva | MAS-SP; USU-RJ and LABÔ-PUC-SP

From Purple to Scarlet Red, the Symbology of a Divine Color

Color is part of all discourses and disciplines, from natural history to theology. The purple color manufactured in the city of Tire and marketed by the hoenicians (the name Phoenicia means land of purple) became a status symbol in several civilizations. The purple of Tire became the color of kings, nobles, priests, and magistrates throughout the Mediterranean. The purple color was also associated with porphyry granite used only in imperial buildings, the concept of porphyrogenites was known since the 6th century, when a child born to a reigning emperor was considered porphyrogenites, that is, born in the Purple Chamber covered with porphyry where the empresses gave birth. Color not only influenced how individuals were perceived by others, but also expressed personal beliefs and aspirations. Context was crucial and that particular hue conveyed the message of divinity and power. The important factor about Tyre's purple was not only its color, but its brightness, its resistance to time and light and its high price, it was a marker of difference and distinction, so valued in Rome that only people of higher social standing as magistrates, consuls, and the emperor were allowed to use it, a constant restriction of sumptuary laws and whose disobedience was punishable by death. Its monetary and symbolic value reflected social hierarchies and restricted use to descent from emperors whose power was matched by the color of the robes and tunics of the Pantokrátor and Theotokos as an indication of divine power. The color that should honor God was also, in antiquity, the color of sovereigns. An early Christian apocryphal text relates representations of the Annunciation with the color purple. The text of James' Protoevangelium dated circa the 2nd century AD describes Mary as one of the pure virgins who was chosen to help weave the veil for the temple. The luck of spinning the threads of true purple and scarlet fell to Mary: and she took the scarlet and held it out. Around 300 AD, Emperor Diocletian decreed the dyeing of purple an imperial monopoly protected by the death penalty, transferring production to Byzantium, later Constantinople, now Istanbul. A symbol of wealth in Greek and Roman times for dyeing togas, and in the Middle Ages for decorating manuscripts, color was so important that some biblical scrolls were dyed and named by purple codices. At the fall of Constantinople in 1453 the purple disappeared with the destruction of the imperial dyehouses. With the end of the Byzantine Empire, a practical issue forced the abandonment of the use of the purple color, but not of its symbology, and then the purple color became scarlet red, being necessary the use of a substitute color for the continuity of the clothing and theological symbology of the brightest colors ever produced by man.

Luma Santos de Oliveira | PUC-SP, Brazil

Semiosis, Art and Aesthetic Experience: Considerations on Artistic Photography with Theme of Everyday  Life

As a way of exploring in depth the specifics of photography with theme of everyday life in the field of art, we propose, in this research, to draw a relationship between the aesthetic experience, based on the ideas of John Dewey, and the semiosis of Charles Sanders Peirce, emphasizing the importance of the concept of continuity in the action of the sign. When investigating studies about the aesthetic experience, we understand that art is communication, in view of this, it’s necessary to establish an interaction between organism and environment. In this process, the presence of qualities unveiled in common experience is essential, they are, for Dewey, roots expanded in the work of art. For the aesthetic experience to take place, it is necessary not only to receive (stimuli, information, etc.), but also to do; this must happen, in a balanced way, both when the artist produces and when the spectator meets the created product. Therefore, we seek to demonstrate how the experience of the work of art corresponds to the way the sign acts, in its signification process. In other words, we determine how Dewey's descriptions align with Peirce's conception that, when in a contact with a sign, the interpreter receives information from its object, culminating in an interpretant, and so on. We are mainly interested here in the ranges of the dynamic interpretant, in its divisions as emotional, energetic and logical interpretant. The photography with theme of everyday life reveals in a straight line the interest in the experience of the common, it extracts unique qualities from what is in our routine and, from them, allows us to experience it satisfactorily through the work of art. The aesthetic experience allows us to break down the barriers we face in our routines, due to the eagerness that excesses in doing and receiving, in a disproportionate way, direct us to impatient actions. The work of art can, therefore, bring about transformations in our perception, through the aesthetic experience.

Rodrigo dos Santos | PUC-SP, Brazil

Music as a Universal Succession of Art in Schelling: Analysis of "Rhythm" as the Possibility of Indifference

Schelling presents music as “the most universal of the royal arts”, and does so in the wake of the succession concept. In the construction of an “other-language” for philosophy, he exposes, as is typical of idealists, the idea that sound, as a transmission, is, in the ideal, the real that exists in art. In theory, Schelling presupposes that the “infinite, formed-in-one” in the finite, can only appear as and while sonority. Schelling's melody, subsequent to the analysis of rhythm, submits itself to the symbolic orientation: “where neither the universal means the particular nor the particular the universal”. And, when analyzing the dimensions of music, such as rhythm, modulation and melody, the first aspect (referred to rhythm) presents the idea of seeking multiplicity, or, as a capacity for indifference, which is exactly the sound. In the bodily fact, music enables the auditory organ to integrate with its opposite. In this way, rhythm is music “determined for reflection and self-awareness”, or even a real self-enumeration of the soul. Schelling, when reflecting on the dimension of rhythm, states that “in general, it is the transformation of an insignificant succession in itself into a significant succession”. It is through his that music expands like a centrifugal force, that is, music enables the unique experience, the unexpected, the ever-new. In other words, rhythm enables the human being to overcome pure identity, as it seeks multiplicity, indifference and the constant overcoming of the insignificant. Schelling points out with the primary idea of rhythm, that "the whole is not subjected to time, but has it in itself", which in a way is not just an external imposition, or even does not mean a limitation of time , but it is the rhythm that sets its own cadence.

Communications session 3

Pragmatism in James and Dewey

Federico Ezequiel López | CIeFi, UNLP, Argentina

Rethinking Technology Through Dewey's Aesthetic, Political and Religious Approach

Technology is a phenomenon of uncontested cultural relevance. Cultures are more and more technological and we increasingly become, to use Latour’s well-known expression, hybrid biotechnological beings. Thus, the growing interest in the philosophy of technology over the last decades comes as no surprise. Remarkably, though, this disciplinary context has overlooked theoretical developments such as John Dewey’s, who could be considered as the first American philosopher of technology. This probably results from Carl Mitcham placing Dewey within the engineering and technocratic tradition in the philosophy of technology, which he views as not being an enriching take on technology. Counter to that claim, the aim of this paper is to offer an overview of Dewey’s philosophy of technology, highlighting its most relevant aspects and the contribution that these could make to the philosophy of present-day technology. We will argue that a Deweyan philosophy of technology is best thought of as consisting of three dimensions: aesthetic, political and religious. The first can be associated with Dewey's concept of situation, one of whose main characteristics is affective and qualitative immediacy. This helps us understand the two-fold relationship that humans have with technical objects, as a necessary component in any attempt to characterize them. Secondly, Dewey’s insights into “material culture” and its relevance on the constitution of the public, along with his ethical and political concerns for the uses of science, constitute a good starting point to think about the political dimension of technology and how it reshapes society. Last but not least, Dewey’s confidence in the possibilities of technology can be considered a bet on the religious phase of the technological experience which, as described in A Common Faith, refers to a kind of experience capable of resulting in a better integration to life. When addressing current discussions on the philosophy of technology, these views can prove useful. Thus, the aesthetic dimension can not only account for some traits in the relationship between human beings and technology, it can also critically complement the concept of technical objects as functional, an idea which seems widely accepted in current debates on the nature of artifacts. Furthermore, Dewey’s political reflections on technology and, more specifically, his analysis of material culture and technology helps us reflect on the value-laden character of technology and the different challenges that democratic culture faces in the era of social media. Finally, what we have called the religious dimension of the technological experience helps us think about the problems and challenges currently posed by transhumanism. It offers a criterion, along the lines of what has recently been discussed by Alfredo Marcos or Ciano Aydin, to critically address the “enhancement” of human beings that transhumanism advocates for.

Horacio Héctor Mercau | USP, Brazil

Rhetorical Deliberation, Democracy and Education in John Dewey

This communication aims to examine the notion of democracy as a creative action, based on political reflections developed by Dewey himself. Our aim is to highlight that Deweyana educational conception is not separated from a precise analysis of the public space and the problem of deliberation that derives from it, and is impregnated with a marked concern for the subject of emotions. We present creative democracy as a foundation for a democratic school, with the aim of bringing together theoretical elements aimed at thinking about the human subject, as in Dewey's proposal. Such an investigation will allow us to examine emotions as discursive practices that underline the special role played by discourses and practices in the constitution of subjectivity. In line with Dewey, we propose that creative democracy guides our actions. For this, we must recognize that emotions are the fundamental element that enables us to review our willingness to perform this task. Dewey's conception of emotions provides us with a reinterpretation of the origin of norms that relate to coping with the problem of motivation. The subject is constituted while relating to the other, adopting their point of view. It is the ability to take on other people's roles that allows our knowledge of the world and the constitution of our identity and, therefore, morality. Dewey offers us a reinterpretation of the problem of motivation: it is the interaction between subjects that constituted the subjects themselves. In this process, emotions and passions are not primitive data, but the result of social interaction and, therefore, modifiable. Sociability, for Dewey, is the origin of the constitution of the self, the decisive factor for the reinvention of democracy, to institute a creative action that, in turn, can reinvent democracy. For this reason, rhetorical deliberation is a tool that society needs to cultivate. Central to a creative democracy that includes deliberation, in the Deweyan sense, is the idea that deliberation precedes and can be directly connected to a collectively decided course of action. It is important to seek that the mass public is communicated, even in decision moments such as elections. In the mini-public, deliberation processes are accessible, but if one is interested in creative, deliberative, and rhetorical democracy as a broad model of legitimacy, the general public needs to be included. Unlike deliberation theories, Dewey's proposal adopts a broader view of deliberation, including rhetoric, thus promoting collective and public associations.

Valdirene Aparecida Pascoal; Alexandre Robson Martinês; Wilson Roberto Veronez Junior | Unesp, Brazil

Pragmatism and the Conception of the Concept in the Knowledge Organization: Contributions by James and  Peirce

This work intends to analyze the potential of pragmatism to support arguments in updating the concept in Knowledge Organization. Hjorland, when debating the epistemology of the concept, highlights its importance for the realization of a cognitive performance. Along these lines, among the epistemologies presented, Hjorland approaches the pragmatism of William James, American philosopher, who defends the stability and permanence of concepts, that is, “the world changes, the subject who perceives changes, but the concepts must remain unchanged because its function is to fix what one thinks” (HJORLAND, 2009). For Hjorland (2009), pragmatism is the most suitable method to base knowledge on the analysis of objectives, purposes, values and consequences. He comments that pragmatism understands the concept as a way of fixing pieces of reality in thought, language and other symbolic systems. However, there are considerations against the stability of the concept, as it analyzes that the new concept may carry characteristics similar to the older concept it replaces, in view of which a conceptual change is characterized. Thus, it is pointed out that concepts are tools for thinking and communicating about human practices, consequently they evolve with them. Knowledge Organization has the concept as an instrument of representation, understood as a unit of knowledge, consequently it constitutes an element that characterizes and offers subsidy for the production of knowledge (DAHLBERG, 1978, FRIEDMAN; THELLEFSEN, 2011, BARITÉ, 2015). Provide a basis for interacting with the universe. Concepts provide horizons and learning in a continuous world (HJORLAND, 2003, 2009). According to Hjorland (2003), concepts can be analyzed and studied in an interdisciplinary way, that is, it is linked to studies in Psychology, Linguistics, Philosophy, Sociology and Artificial Intelligence. For James, concepts classify the world by subjective interests, according to private ends, related to social or collective ends. In his pragmatism, James sought to respond to the escapism of the rationalists and the materialism of the empiricists, therefore, inspired by Peirce, he proposes a theory of pragmatism linked to the notion of truth, in which "an idea, belief or statement is true when it agrees with reality , is false when it disagrees” (DE WAAL, 2007, p. 69). Hjorland indicates that, for pragmatism, concepts are ways of fixing parts of reality in thought, language and symbolic systems, and this fixation is due to equivalent functional classes of things. Peirce, to differentiate his theory from James's Pragmatism, proposes Pragmaticism and combines the action of the individual with the ideal of conduct: "What we think is interpreted in terms of what we are prepared to do, based on deliberation." (PEIRCE, CP 5.27; p. 116, 1903). Thus, the Peircean pragmatic maxim is oriented as a maxim of conduct, in which deliberation is a guide for action; unlike James, who maintains pragmatism in terms of the meaning of a concept based on its application and validation in the world. Based on Peircean pragmatist characterization, it is possible to adopt a fallibilist stance in relation to the concept. What would not be possible in James' thought: "The whole function of philosophy must be to find what definitive difference it will make for you and me, in definite moments of our lives, if this formula of the world or that other is true". (JAMES, 1979, p. 19). It is understood, therefore, that the Peircean pragmatic maxim, by embracing elements of realism and fallibilism, is capable of grounding a notion of truth that does not interrupt itself. On the contrary, the notion of truth is based on reality, which guides action by maintaining a habit with a tendency to reasonableness, that is, it permeates meaning and claims the continuum of knowledge.

Frederik Moreira dos Santos | URFB, Brazil

The Paths of Informational Reification: A Pragmatic-Marxist Perspective on Information Theory

Nowadays, we are facing a process of reification to use the information word in a similar way happened to the concept of energy. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the concept of energy became central to engineering and thermodynamics, but only later it became more accurately defined as a physical process and its potential. Some Deweyan texts call our attention to the process that leads to the results of investigation being hypostasized. This intellectual approach and practice is crucial to a construction of scientific models and theories. However, John Dewey draws our attention to certain situations when philosophical problems arising due to forgetting the contextual and active process of open and continuous inquiry. We focus on the debate about the information process as an example of this critical analysis and articulate a Deweyan pathway with Marxian reflections on commodity fetishization to shed light on what has happened to the concept of information in contemporary times. We propose a semantic approximation of the concept of hypostasis in Dewey with the meaning widely used by Marxist authors, i.e., the concept of reification. We intend to demonstrate that both share similarities, and the meaning of reification has a political and economic dimension added in its definition. Thus, the substantializing and reification of information meaning becomes present in technical and ordinary languages as follows: information storage (data and memory), data packet value, information manipulation, etc. Such abstraction and conceptual systematization have become central to science since the middle of 20th century. However, despite of its importance in contemporary culture, there is still much to be clarified and advanced in terms of its definition. We have realized the commitment of many authors with the reified dimension of information. It gives us clues to understand such obstacles. Nowadays, there are several proposals to define information in order to meet certain specific purposes, ranging from data quantification, linguistic applications, to the solution of some epistemic question related to its foundations. Despite of measurements that can be taken by using the Shannon-Weaver equation, we argue that such an equation cannot grasp the semantic dimension of communication. We propose a critical analysis of the use and of some ways of conceptualizing information.

Bruno Bueno Poli | PUC-SP, Brazil

Modern Philosophy and William James on Mind-Body Problem

The present paper will aim to briefly present the development of the mind-body problem, beginning with Descartes and his presuppositions, its canonical resposes in modern philosophy, and culminating in the neutral monism of William James. The mind-body problem arises especially from Descartes through the "substantial" distinction between soul and body and their respective attributes, thought and extension, which form an exclusive disjunction; that is, that which thinks is not extensive and vice versa. Moreover, the attribute thought is understood in this context within the framework of his representationalist theory - thinking is first of all relating to "mental items" and not directly to any kind of reality. Having accepted these assumptions, the question arises as to the intelligibility of the relationship between these two independent substances that do not share any properties. In the basic cases of perception and voluntary movement, the question concerns the possibility that movement (extension's mode) produces representation and representation (will) produces movement. It seems that neither of these relationships would be intelligible under the background of this metaphysics. Although Descartes' answer to the problem was recognized as unsatisfactory, the problem he introduced was not. In modern philosophy three theories have become canonical as responses to it: occasionalism (Geulincx, Malebranche), pre-established harmony (Leibniz, Wolff), and physical influx (Suarez, Crusius, pre-critical Kant). These responses share the Cartesian assumptions of both representationalism and substance ontology. Especially after Kant's break with traditional metaphysics and the developments in 19th century psychology, dualism ceases to be substantial, and becomes a phenomenical, where the distinction occurs between internal and external phenomena/experience. The question about the possibility of a relationship between the two nevertheless remains, especially for those who presuppose representationalism. In this context, William James (1904), influenced by Mach (1900), proposes his theory of neutral monism, according to which mind and body are just complexes of neutral elements (colors, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, etc.) in more or less stable relations. For James, these neutral elements are constituents of what he calls pure experience, still being neither sensation nor physical object. They are particulars to which we have immediate access, without the interposition of a representation. Under their basis and their causal connections arise mental and physical objects. Thus, since the mental and the physical refer to the same elements considered under different relations, there is no unbridgeable gap between them. Rejecting the representationalist theory and the absolute distinction between mental and physical, whether in its substantial or phenomenal variant, James seems to be able to account for the relationship between the two.

Conceição de Maria Sousa Araujo | UFPI, Brazil

John Dewey's Pragmatist Epistemology: Experience and Nature

This present study with the theme: John Dewey: Pragmatist Epistemology: Experience and Nature, intends to reflect on the influence of Darwinism in John Dewey's philosophy and the evolution of North American pragmatism. The article seeks to investigate through Dewey's work: La Miseria de La Epistemología(2000), how Dewey interpreted Darwinian evolutionism in his theory of knowledge. The objective of the research is to discuss how the ideas of evolution of North American pragmatism manifested itself, as well as to analyze the contribution of Darwin's discoveries on the evolution of species, knowing their impacts on pragmatism with regard to the notion of experience and nature. Concluding that Dewey's contribution to the emancipation and reframing of philosophy is indisputable, as it represents in the field of knowledge, a new logic based on experience and action as promoters of new habits. Finally, we will emphasize the possible contributions and philosophical implications for the notion of nature and experience in pragmatism from the understanding of evolutionary theory.

Communications session 4

Pragmatism, Art and Humanities

Jessyca Eiras Jatobá Santos | Unesp - Marília, Brazil

Anthropomorphism as a Method and Empiricism as a Prophylactic: For a Concept of the Human Not Split from Nature

The objective of this work is to elucidate the conception of the human as belonging to the natural world through debates about the concept of anthropomorphism – and its culmination in the conception of such a posture as a method in contemporary ethology. The concept of anthropomorphism, in its emergence, was understood as the undue attribution of human attributes to non-human animals. According to some authors, anthropomorphism understood as a categorical error is a mistake when it does not presuppose experience, as it will only be through it that we will know whether a characteristic is exclusively human or not. Such an understanding may imply that under the fear of anthropomorphism, anthropocentric assumptions and the exaggeration and overintellectualization of human capacities may be hidden. The debate about how to interpret the results of studies in non - human animals in comparison with studies in humans can would be seen as a debate on an inconsistent application of that op sicólogo C. Lloyd Morgan erected as his canon, also known as the principle of conservatism .According to Morgan's Canon, it is understood that we should not interpret an action as the result of the exercise of a superior capacity if it can be interpreted as the result of a cognitive faculty lower on the psychological scale. The application of this principle is inconsistent, according to some authors , because, although it is a golden rule in research on animal cognition, it is rarely respected in research on human cognition. Sorber (1998) understands that there are cultural factors that produced an unequal emphasis on scientific thought. The author draws attention to the fact that Morgan's canon implies that we are obligated not to assume the existence of higher faculties without having evidence to do so, which does not imply assuming the inexistence of these faculties – something that, according to him, Morgan intends to support. Not assuming the existence of something is different from assuming its inexistence. The author then explores the implications of replacing the words "higher" and "lower" Morgan the words of canon "derivative" and "ancestral" When there is this replacement, the argument leads to a different conclusion from Morgan, for the principle of parsimony will lead us not to treat human beings as different from other living beings. Thus, if two behaviors are homologous, then the hypothesis that they are produced by the same mechanisms or close mechanisms is more parsimonious . It is in this sense that contemporary ethology, such as De Waal (2007) and Bekoff (2007) understands m that the closer we are one species, most anthropomorphism can contribute to the understanding and the greater the prejudice of denial that assignment. De Waal names this resistance by ascribing similarities between human and non-human animals as “ anthroponegation ” . The scholar seeks to show that scientists who work with non-human animals – especially an animal close to us evolutionarily – cannot fail to interpret many of their actions in terms commonly used in relation to humans (in which they are accused by other scientists of anthropomorphism ) . There is here the understanding that the description that approximates humans and non-human animals adopts a language that we are used to using for human behavior. In this sense, it is inevitable and even necessary that such descriptions sound anthropomorphic. More than a reformulation of the way we see animals, the posture that precedes our knowledge of animal cognition must aim at reformulating the concept of human, starting from the empirical dimension.
 
 

Jéssica Ágne Campêlo Nunes; Heraldo Aparecido Silva| UFPI, Brazil

The Redescription of the Monster Culture's Notion Richard Rorty's Philosophy

Our research proposal shows that the theme of monster culture is covered by Rorty's philosophy. The research problem is to investigate how monster culture can be effectively articulated with Rorty's ideas (2007). Our hypothesis is that the notion of monster culture can be imaginatively expanded to contemplate some of the main points of Rorty's philosophy. Such articulation will be carried out through bibliographical analysis and argumentation of philosophical texts and also through the use of philosophical comic books, in which the themes worked are approached from a neopragmatist perspective. In this way, we can interpret the concept of monster culture as an alternative amalgamation of what Rorty considers strange, wronged, different, excluded and marginalized people. The research proposal consists, then, in carrying out a redescription of the concept of monster culture from Rorty’s philosophy (2007). With that, we started with the idea that comics demonstrate several ethical and moral issues that, even if indirectly, can be related to the philosophical themes proposed here as a subject of study (SILVA, 2021). Thus, we can ask philosophical questions about a certain reading, drawing or expression. The marginalization of certain individuals or social groups is initially caused by ethical questions about their different behaviors or outside of contemporary normative standards (COHEN, 1996). From this perspective, vocabulary redescriptions help to create cultural monsters. Thus, it is important to understand what makes a certain society decide what is right and what is wrong through the redescription of vocabularies and why the monster body and monster vocabulary are significant for thinking about this issue. We can create new individuals by using philosophical comics, using new redescriptions to the monster vocabulary. The creation of redescriptions about monster culture can contribute to the development of new subjectivities, new human beings and new social practices (RORTY, 2007). We can reach this by reading philosophical comics and understanding why we should not marginalize people, as Rorty defends.

Keywords: Rorty. Neopragmatism. Monster. Body. Embodied vocabularies.

 Francisco Raimundo Chaves de Sousa; Heraldo Aparecido Silva | UFPI, Brazil

The Social Role of Literary Narratives and Metaphors in Richard Rorty's Philosophy

The research proposes to investigate the social function of narratives and literary metaphors in Richard Rorty's philosophy. This is a bibliographical research focused on some specific moments of Rorty's philosophical production, in which the notions of narratives and literary metaphors are discussed. We also use texts from other philosophers and literary critics whose texts were cited by Rorty in the context of the discussion of the topic discussed here, such as: Umberto Eco and Milan Kundera. As a secondary reference, works and articles by interpreters that address themes of ethics, political philosophy and social philosophy in Rorty's thought will be used as a secondary reference. The central point of the investigation implies the recognition of a divergence between the positions of Eco and Rorty regarding the notion of interpretation; and also in proposing a convergence between Kundera and Rorty's interpretation of the philosophical aspect of literary novels. Although this convergence is not made explicit by both authors, we have elements in their respective theoretical productions that attest to Kundera's influence on Rorty regarding the use of metaphors and literary narratives in the discussion of political, ethical and social issues. This finding is relevant because it leads us to the presentation of the results of our research, according to which the interpretation of Rorty's neopragmatist proposes a practical use for metaphors and literary narratives as elements that foster individual and social change, as they suggest through the imagination , alternative ethical, political and social scenarios; as well as inspiring specific redescriptive changes to the descriptions of individuals and their community. Thus, this research highlights a fruitful field of studies for contemporary philosophy, particularly in Rorty's neopragmatism.

Izildete de Sousa Torres; Heraldo Aparecido Silva | UFPI, Brazil

Rorty's Notion of Solidarity in the Novel 1984, by George Orwell

This work has its theoretical bases based on the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, who proposes that philosophy presents itself as a process of placing ideas in different contexts and presenting new descriptions (CALDER, 2006. p. 9). The theme discussed here is what we can understand by practical philosophy in Rorty, starting from the notion of solidarity and its ethical and political consequences. Considering that George Orwell's works are marked by a deep awareness of social injustices and an intense opposition to totalitarianism, the research question was: what is the notion of solidarity developed by Richard Rorty from the novel 1984 by George Orwell? As described in the above discussion, this research has as its main object of analysis the question of the notion of Rorty's solidarity in the work 1984, by George Orwell. From this perspective, we sought to observe Rorty's theoretical basis expressed in the work Contingency, irony and solidarity (2007) and commentators who interact with the studied object. Given the question posed above, we started from the hypothesis that Orwell, in his book 1984, describes the politics of the 20th century. Through the Rortyan notion of solidarity, we emphasize that Rorty conceives the novel as an inventive literary genre. Thus, we will show the inspiring value of great works of literature, highlighting the novel from the perspectives of Milan Kundera, Harold Bloom and Richard Rorty. From Kundera's perspective, we must look at the novel's concepts of wisdom, ontological hypothesis, and experimental egos; Bloom, in turn, highlights the concept of wisdom literature; Rorty uses the perspectives of Kundera and Bloom to emphasize that novelists are inventive and more detailed than philosophers. Then, we will explain Rorty's notion of solidarity, highlighting the philosopher's instruments: historical redescription and recontextualization. Following this path, we will point out some questions about Rorty's politics, dystopias and liberalism in Orwell, to deal with Rorty's notion of solidarity. Finally, we will approach solidarism in Orwell, pointing out Rorty's impressions of Orwell, to show that the research result has as an indication that in the work 1984, by George Orwell, we find the Rortyan notion of solidarity.

Tiago Gomes Landim | PUC-SP, Brazil

Myths and Tragedies as a Place for Philosophical Argumentation

Human beings are symbolic animals, capable of offering symbols as a representation of their internal or external world. The symbol production process, always preceded by an understanding of what it is intended to represent, often leads to the creation of complex universes, permeated by fantasy that creatively fills in the gaps that may exist in the rational understanding line. Historically, humanity has been gifted with magnificent narratives that, in addition to enchanting us with their literary structure, offer ways to reach places never thought of, if these narrative styles were neglected. Aristotle, on the other hand, in his work on poetry and art, deals with forms of imitation, that is, the representation of reality in a mimetic way, since the very act of keeping the world external to itself within memory could already be understood as a a kind of imitation, whose later external representation is either through words that show themselves as ideas or, as in the case of the Aristotelian work in question, through art such as poetry, tragedy, comedy. The problem that arises from the conflict in the construction of a narrative that imitates something is to make clear the distinction between what is not fiction and, therefore, construction as an attempt to portray reality as reliably as possible and the simple construct that can be called fiction plain and simple. According to the philosopher Richard Rorty, this doubt deals with the possibility of distinguishing between the real and the fictitious. The option taken here is much less daring than this discussion, which would demand a gigantic discussion with phenomenologists who deny the possibility of capturing the real by human beings, with hermeneutics who carry in the subjectivity of the context of those who look at the compromise of credibility of the possible representation, or even, as has just been pointed out here, a discussion with the analytic philosophy that seeks the plausibility of the signs that are used to try to reflect on something. It is decided here to collect what would be the spirit of mythological narratives, that is, the establishment of a bridge between a narrative and the object to which it is narrated with the intention of communicating a message at the end. The use of some myths as metaphors that can facilitate the understanding of complex reasoning, aiming at what Aristotle already called recognition, which “is the passage from ignoring to knowing”. Therefore, the idea is to use three myths well known to the general public - Daedalus and Icarus, Prometheus, and Narcissus - to, from some elements of their logical structures, propose an understanding of the conceptions of knowledge, scientific knowledge and knowledge philosophical. In order to also establish a cut that did not require a certain “omni-comprehensiveness”, the philosopher Karl Popper's line of thought is adopted.

Communications session 5

Pragmatism and Neopragmatism

Vinicius Francisco Apolinario | UFES, Brazil

Perception and Experience in Susan Haack's Foundiherentist Theory

Perception is a central element of discussions about empirical knowledge. Questions about it are almost as old as philosophy itself and, especially since the 20th century, with the emergence of the cognitive sciences as we know them today, perception has also been the subject of intense debate in the scientific field. In the philosophical field, perception plays a key role in matters concerning the justification of empirical beliefs, because different understandings of it lead to different conceptions of how to be adequately justified about a given belief or empirical hypothesis.  In this scenario, an important task of epistemology is to judge, analyze, and understand the role of perception in the justification of empirical beliefs. Several epistemological approaches have different theories of perception that attempt to explain, among other things, the relation that our perceptual capacities have with our beliefs, the nature of perception - that is, what constitutes perception -, how perception puts us in contact with the world.  In the course of the present investigation, we have identified two central, traditional approaches concerning epistemological theories of justification: (a) foundationalism and (b) coherentism. Both approaches have different grasps of the role of perception, with profound implications for their respective abilities to provide answers to the problems classically associated with them. Foundationalists tend to rely on representationalist theories of perceptual experience, notably "sense-data theory." Coherentists, on the other hand, tend to defend so-called "causal" approaches to perception. Overall, we find an aporetic scenario, with both approaches encountering serious limitations due, above all, to the theory of perception underlying them. In analyzing the virtues and vices of these theories, we identify theoretical potential in a recent, alternative approach to the traditional proposals, which follows the Peircean pragmatist tradition, called "foundherentism." Based on Haack's foundherentism, we defend the hypothesis that it is possible to find a more satisfactory answer to the problem of the justification of empirical beliefs, in a way that avoids the main limitations of the traditional approaches (foundationalism and coherentism) but preserving their relevant insights. However, we find difficulties in Haack's theory that need to be addressed in future research.

Bruno Araujo Alencar; Heraldo Aparecido Silva| UFPI, Brazil

Richard Rorty's Critique of Michel Foucault: A Neopragmatic Perspective

This work aims to present the critique of the American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007) to the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1924-1984). Initially, we will discuss how the neopragmatist tries to build Foucault's philosophy, showing how the vocabulary adopted appears to be inadequate to current human practices, as it focuses only on analyzing the historiography of the past, showing that the maneuver of power, exercised by certain types of democracy, like the liberals, it impedes the reach of the ethics of self-care, a relationship with oneself (rapport à soi). Thus, the American philosopher uses some linguistic tools to (re)describe some aspects of Foucault's thought that criticizes liberal democracy. Among such ad hoc techniques are appropriation, which plays the role of connecting the French philosopher with the neopragmatic cause; and historical recontextualization, to read Foucault's philosophy in an unusual way, so that its philosophical proposal becomes more attractive to cultural politics. For Rorty, self-care goes against his solidary utopia, as Foucault only projects the ironist's ideas, adopting private and unshared vocabularies, concerned only with his self-creation, staying away from the liberal, who, in turn, adopts public vocabularies and shared, and, who considers cruelty between human beings the worst thing to do. For Rorty, Foucault should be (re)described to be useful for social hope, according to the liberal ironist, people who oscillate between desires for private perfection and social justice, without hurting other people. Such a context of private perfection only refers to the desires of a strong poet, a novelist with useless narratives for the purpose of self-creation. Rorty redescribes Foucault's vocabulary in order to be useful for social hope, while becoming an edifying philosopher of his solidary utopia.

Fabíola Ballarati Chechetto | PUC-SP, Brazil

Between Atoms and Algorithms: Habits of Interactions to See How the (Dis)continuous Appears 
 

How does the invisible that seems indivisible appear or make itself visible? “Scientists take the best picture of atoms so far with the help of algorithms” was the headline of an article in the Science section of Folha de S. Paulo in July 2021. As I read it, I imagined what Democritus' reaction would be, the last of the pre-Socratic philosophers, who twenty-six centuries ago, together with his master Leucippus, sought to discover the generating principle of all things (arché) through rationality and no longer through mythical narratives. For these pluralistic exponents of the School of Abdera in ancient Greece, the atom, meaning "indivisible" would be the smallest possible part of everything there is.
Keeping the original atomists and returning to the contemporary that presses for the current news, a fact is that a team of scientists from Cornell University (USA) presented to the scientific community and the public, a photograph that, taken with the aid of a lensless electron microscope and with an advanced algorithm, it presented the best resolution of an atom. By magnifying a mineral by 100 million times (praseodymium crystal), it was possible to “reconstruct the image from the patterns resulting from the interaction of the object with an electron beam” (Batista, 2021). The emission of the electron beam was essential to capture “patterns” of the object through “interaction” and once captured, the patterns were “translated” into images.  Now, without going into the physical-chemical specificity of the experiment, but taking advantage of the phenomenon to observe what interests us to apprehend an epistemology that is guided by experience and not the opposite, we can ask ourselves: how the habits that appear in the interactions between natures of science (thought) and matter (world) show a continuous that, pre-phenomenological, would adhere to an ontological sense of the world, experience, science and life?  Charles Sanders Peirce's Phenomenology and Pragmaticism provide us with reflective elements for this research with its philosophy and logic on the categories of experience, mediation, the notion of tendency to habit and the doctrine of the continuum, together with Peircean studies in Ibri ( 2015, 2020); both complemented by the dialogic tension that we venture to propose, making the epistemological differentiation between interaction and mediation worked by Ferrara (2015, 2018).  In this sense, from the study of the phenomenon intertwined with the question raised, it is possible to diagram three levels of analysis:  a) To see/photograph the atom, the technique of science (logarithm, with its laws) needed to emit an element of nature itself (electron beam) to interact with other electrons (from the atoms of the object to be seen). The result of this meeting of habits between the laws of logarithm and the rules of the mineral object configured the possibility of making visible the patterns or rules of conduct of the object (habits), in which real and ideal coexist. The electron seems to be the “common” key (the same one) that enabled the interaction and consequent visualization of these habits - not from the atom itself, but from what was derived from that interaction between habits;  b) Reconstructing an image of a substantial element of nature, which is microscopic, leads to the perception of inferences underlying these interactions;  c) These inferences, to be worked on as conjectures of new inferences, relativize the effectiveness of a discretization in "laws" and "means", since the interactions, when entering the game, indicate one of the most elusive qualities of the continuous: chance in movement.  So that if the "translation" of these habitual patterns of mind-matter into technical image is of the order of generalizations, that is, of a third that “mediates” between a first (possible, continuous) and a second (which reacts), and was only made feasible through “interaction”, an event that we may not notice, although constitutive for “seeing” and “knowing ”, how does the continuous appear, through the discontinuous?
 
 

Otávio de Lima e Silva | UFMS, Brazil

The So-called "Crisis of Representation" in Language in Contemporary Twentieth-century Philosophy: Reflections Based on the Pragmatism of C.S. Peirce

In this communication, we will present the general lines of Peircean philosophy, based on the work "Kósmos Noetós" by Ivo Ibri and the "Collected Papers" by Charles S. Peirce. Based on Peirce's Semiotics, its foundations and its categories, we will analyze the theme of the crisis of representation in language in contemporary philosophy, which emerged under the influence of several philosophers after Peirce's death in 1914, passing through Foucault until culminating in Derrida, one of the main defenders of this crisis. Among Peirce's commentators, we will mainly use Nöth as a guideline for the theme against the theories defending the supposed crisis and we will emphasize Peirce's realist ontology as a philosophical foundation against the nominalist bases that underpin the post-structuralist theories of Francophone authors. In the 20th century, a very rich field was opened for the performance of a nascent and very fruitful science, semiotics, in particular Peircean Semiotics, as a tool for reading and analyzing signs. There are many philosophers, after Peirce, who announce a “crisis of representation” in language, such as Heidegger, Lukács and Lyotard. Other authors, with less emphasis, present a “loss of representation”, such as Foucault in his work "The words and the things". In this work, Foucault focuses on the history of knowledge, forging an “archaeology of knowledge”, identifying a rupture in the ternary sign models, which became dyadic from Port-Royal (XVII-XVIII) to Saussure's structuralism in the century XX. From the Foucaultian point of view, representation, in the traditional molds, enters into crisis, ceasing to be speculative - in the sense of reflecting a description of nature - and becomes structural, aiming to analyze the internal elements of the constitution of the language, breaking the link between sign and reality. However, there are more radical theories, such as the deconstruction of representation in Derrida. Derrida's theory defends the impossibility of re-presentation in Husserl as a reproduction of the presentation or presentification. It also defends a crisis of representation in Peirce's semiotics, more precisely, in its unlimited semiosis. We will make a critical analysis of Derrida's case in the light of Peirce's semiotics, in order to expose one of the later developments of Peirce's thought on this problem.
 
 

Marco Antonio Conceição; Heraldo Aparecido Silva | IFPI, Brazil

Philosophy as “Liberal Utopia” in Richard Rorty

Philosophy as “liberal utopia” in Richard Rorty brings as its theme Rorty's proposal for a more socially effective philosophy presented in his work Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1992). The purpose of the communication is to highlight in the aforementioned work the philosophical path through which the philosopher defends the contingent character of language and suggests the possibility of a philosophy as a "liberal utopia", based on the figure of the philosopher as a "liberal ironist" and focused on “human solidarity”. The concept of utopia, commonly understood as an imaginative description of an ideal society, based on fair laws and political-economic institutions truly committed to the well-being of the community, when associated with the term liberal, acquires a character in Rorty's philosophy more realistic and reachable from the power of narrative forms, more effective than theoretical discursive forms. Philosophers such as Hegel, for Rorty (1992), helped us to a “historicist turn”, as they promoted a replacement of truth by freedom that continued in the philosophies of Dewey and Habermas. Other philosophers, however, such as Heidegger and Foucault, were also very important and from a view of socialization as anti-ethical, which follows the line of understanding of the philosopher Nietzsche, they constituted a second group that excelled in the “desire for self-creation, for private autonomy.” (RORTY, 1992, p. 16). In this perspective, as one group proposes “a self-created and autonomous human life”, the other group proposes “the effort to make our institutions and practices fairer and less cruel.” (RORTY, 1992, p. 16). These are two irreconcilable groups and the opposition between them could only be thought of "if there was a philosophical perspective with a greater degree of understanding that would allow us to embrace self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity in a single vision." (RORTY, 1992, p. 16). For Rorty (1992), it was not without reason that the novel, the docudrama, the film, the television program, among other narrative forms, even if slowly and gradually, came over time to attract more attention than the sermon and the treatise. Human solidarity is, for the philosopher, a task for genres and not for theories, which achieve more effectively than the latter, the mission of seeing other human beings as one of us and not as them.
 
 

Izabel Maria Gomes da Paz; Heraldo Aparecido Silva | UFPI, Brazil

Philosophy for Social Hope: A Redescription of Rorty

This paper aims to present aspects of the philosophy of the neopragmatist Richard Rorty, based on his criticism of the questions of traditional philosophy, for the practice of a philosophy focused on social hope, based on aspects developed by him, such as the creation of solidarity through imaginative redescriptions. For the purpose of this paper, we gathered arguments to theoretically support the questions presented. Thus, we carried out a dialogue between the works of Rorty that deal with aspects developed by him, such as the critique of rationality as a distinctively human capacity, issues developed historically by traditional philosophy, and the construction of solidarity through imaginative redescriptions. Then, we survey the arguments present in the following works by the American philosopher: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), and in the chapters Human Rights, Rationality, Sentimentality, and Cultural Difference, from Truth and Progress (1998) and in the chapter Pragmatism and Romanticism from Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007), aspect of the critique on the thought of rationality, cruelty, and the construction of solidarity and social hope. Initially, we will present the Rortyan conception of cruelty and its possibilities of affectation and scope, since it goes beyond the physical pain caused to another person, because being cruel is not an isolated act of people considered inhuman, but something that can be practiced by any of us. In this aspect, we will present Rorty's critical view on the assumption of the existence of an ahistorical human nature, articulated with the theme of rationality. For Rorty throughout these works suggests we stop asking ourselves who are we? Or what is human nature? To propose, alternatively, ideas and questions about what world we will leave to future generations? (RORTY, 2005a). Suggesting then a redescription of philosophy and philosophical questions, and giving less interest in what refers to questions of a-historical human nature, because as we realize the human malleability in historical contexts we lose interest in such questionings. And so, prioritizing imagination and the progress of feelings. Thus, the progress of feelings is a growing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and different people, with different realities, as more important than the differences, as the result of a sentimental education. Then, we present from a Rortyan perspective, how we can come to see the other as one of us, through imaginative and redescriptive capacity, inspiring the practice of human solidarity in order to avoid cruelty. Through imaginative redescription, as the ability to use noises and signs giving rise to bigger and better social practices.
 
 

Communication session 6

Semiotics and Epistemology

Sonia Cristina Bocardi de Moraes | Unesp - Marília, Brazil

Normal Interpretant, Form and Information

Information considered here as a process of relationships, whether in the transmission of signs so that there is communication, or in the relationships established in a process of signification. The relationship of causality and meaning, being a dynamic, evolutionary process in Peirce’s conception, starts from a form as a system of signs that organizes itself into a process and evolves into an interpretant.  The sign that generates interpretant and this interpretant that becomes itself a sign that pursues signification, based on the way of having different attentions on the same theme, in different but related sequences, and there is the path to the hypothesis. In this transformation from sign to interpretant, presented, can be as an abduction. The freshness of novelty in a hypothesis coming from the emotional or energetic interpretant, carries the abduction in the continuity of the logical process seeking a Normal Interpretant, as described for Lady Welby, with a view to a final interpretant. The Normal interpretant is in the period of articulation between the immediate interpretant, or that interpretant that, through the senses, provides information for the logical sequence of understanding that is always open to new meanings, in the indeterminacy of a possible final interpretant, always to come, always further up.  The passage from firstness to thirdness mediated by the action of checking meaning. Action possible by brute force, by the concrete existence of secondness, and provides the generalization of the concept belonging to thirdness, thus marking the recognized form based on quality in firstness. In this sense, the linking and passage of firstness and thirdness relates, through the admired qualities, and then perceived, what succinct elements represented. Taking form implies the continuity between reality and existence, in the informational process that molds the interpretant in its power of thirdness, coming from the possibility offered by quality in the first place.  The attribution of meaning that determines the continuity of the interpretant in an evolutionary process, however, implies the criterion of truth and ethical judgment in the process of meaning, using the aesthetic good that may or not obtained. Therefore, semiosis offers true information linking the mediation action of the sign to the process in search of truth, provided by the pragmatic method. In this sense, the deductive anticipation of the process that gives meaning to the action informs.  The function of the sign, independent of the material or form substrate, is to convey information, that is, to trigger a mediation that may or may not become true, may or may not be fallible. The fact of somehow triggering the relationship considered information will certainly be a semiotic process. The point raised by Peirce is that everything that comes to our knowledge that can be information accomplished through signs.  Reality and existence happen simultaneously in the formation of the interpretant when transmitted by materiality, the action and reaction of secondness, the formation of representation in thirdness. Purpose drives the process, action through expectation guides action, producing both what is expected, so much openness to chance.  It is possible to determine the understanding of information as a normal interpretant, formalized in a habit, analyzed in the following argument: Information is the passage from reality to existence. Scientific fact checking allows for true consideration through meaning in a logical procedure that can scientifically prove the truth demonstrated deductively and inductively.

Maria Alejandra Madi | PUC-SP, Brazil

Markets, Signs and Beliefs: A Semiotic and Pragmatic Approach under the Realism of Charles S. Peirce

In accordance with the philosophical contribution of Charles S. Peirce, a semiotic and pragmatic perspective on markets emphasizes the influence of economic institutions as social minds influencing beliefs and actions. Considering a philosophically oriented semiotics, the aim of this contribution is to explore the meaning of the circulation of signs in the context of an ontological and epistemological approach to market phenomena. In thinking about the markets under Peirce's Realism, its general representation is the logic mediation for the understanding of the economic reality, in which social, cultural, and institutional issues cannot be disregarded. In view of this, it is feasible to say that the evolution of the market is affected by multiple decisions arising from semiotic interpretations of the economic agents. In this line of philosophical thinking, it can be argued that the interaction between logical and emotional interpretants shapes beliefs and, therefore, actions. Therefore, it is worth asking: How to incorporate the emotional interpretants, that is, the qualisigns, in a realistic approach to markets? What is the epistemological relevance of interpretations that do not only refer to logical habits? Furthermore, we may ask: How to incorporate the emotional interpretants, that is to say, the qualisigns, in a semiotic and pragmatic approach to the market? In order to elaborate this analysis about the importance of emotional interpretants in semiotic chains, it is considered that the concepts of "life" and the three categories of "experience" are philosophically axial. The phenomenological category of Firstness is associated to a variety of qualities of feelings that, as signs of Firstness, affect decision-making. Indeed, Peirce highlights that emotions, understood as immediate interpretants, are part of the semiotic process, although they cannot be taken as concepts. In this regard, Ivo A. Ibri´s reflections emphasizes that the emotional interpretants are always present in the semiotic dialogue, as signs that represent the Firstness of phenomena. In effect, in the semiotic process, we have indirect access to objects through the construction of mediations in which emotional interpretants cannot be ignored. We conclude that, under Peirce's Realism, a semiotic approach to the market circulation of signs requires the consideration of the category of Firstness, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimensions, and in its articulation with Pragmatism. Qualities of feeling, perceptions and immediate judgments cannot be neglected in the study of those beliefs and actions that currently favour immediacy in business and precariousness in society.
 
 

Juliana Rocha Franco; Priscila Monteiro Borges  | UEMG; UNB, Brazil

Some Pragmatic Consequences for the Order of Object Determination in Peirce's Late Semiotics

Among the many questions still open regarding Peirce’s extended theory of signs (developed in his maturity after 1905, but more specifically in 1908-9), is the issue of the ordering of the trichotomies. A proper decision regarding the order of the trichotomies demands a discussion of the entire semiotic process and the order of determination between its terms: the sign, its objects and its interpretants. The present article will address only one part of this process, which concerns the relationship between the sign and its objects. When developing the notion of object, subdividing it into immediate and dynamic, Peirce begins to consider the objects as aspects to be considered in the definition of the classes of signs, proposing the trichotomies of the dynamic object and the immediate object. The introduction of these two new trichotomies, in turn, brings in a problem, since now it becomes necessary to determine the order in which they must occur, whether before or after the sign trichotomy. Diverging opinions regarding this ordering are found both in Peirce’s own texts, which now present the trichotomies of the objects first, now the trichotomy of the sign first; and in his commentators (Weiss and Burks 1945, Lieb 1953, Sanders 1970, Savan 1977, Farias and Queiroz 2003, Borges 2010, Jappy 2019). We will investigate this problem not only by discussing the definitions of the concepts of sign, dynamic object and immediate object, but also by seeking a sort of pragmatic clarification of the matter, presenting a reflection about the philosophical and semiotic consequences of the different proposals for the ordering of these trichotomies to this day. The relationship of determination between sign and object leads us, for instance, to discuss the ontological character of the dynamic object. Placing the dynamic object after the sign may even help to explain the functioning of ficcional signs, created by the imagination, but is this order really coherent with Peirce’s philosophy? On the other hand, would it be possible to talk about lying signs if every object was determined by its own sign?
 
 

Francisco Dário de Andrade Bandeira | UFC, Brazil

Possible Convergences Between a Pragmatist Epistemology and the Philosophy of Information

The definition of knowledge inherited from tradition was presented in terms of justified true belief. However, since the 1980s it has been argued that knowledge could be defined in terms of information-based belief, especially information derived from direct perception experiences. In this context, approaches emerge that take into account the notion of information as a central component for the constitution of knowledge. Studies are also being multiplied to further understand what information is, especially because, in addition to being capable of generating knowledge, it is, unequivocally, a notion that has been widely used in various sciences. Yet such usage commonly lacks greater clarity or definition. In turn, pragmatism understands knowledge as associated with human action whose purpose is not so much to passively represent reality through ideas as to organize and interpret experience so that this action can progress. In this approach, knowledge is inseparable from valuation, as every judgment incorporates in itself, not a pure description of reality, but several possibilities of practical interaction with it. A pragmatist epistemology can be organized from the following distinctions: a. naturalistic attitude; b. primacy of practice; c. empiricism; d. fallibilism; and. anti-fundamentalism; f. inmanentism. Within the scope of the relationships explored here, the appeal to different modes of occurrence (e.g. material, semantic, social information, etc.) of information associated with the generation of knowledge would underlie pragmatism, although this may occur in many cases in a manner implicit or not conceptualized. In the context of studies on information, it is argued that a new philosophical approach of an onto-epistemic and structuring nature on information can be useful to epistemic pragmatism, as it can offer proposals for understanding the various dimensions of human experiences and associated actions to information-based knowledge generation. This informational approach starts from issues and material aspects of information, moving then to semantic and social dimensions of information. An informational theoretical framework of a structuring nature may emerge based on the use that various sciences make of the notion of information. Given the possibility of this advance, some convergences between a philosophical approach to information and a pragmatist epistemology will then be presented.

Patricia Fonseca Fanaya | UFSC, Brazil

“What if?”: The Imagination that Drives our own Rationality

Imagination is an essential faculty for the development of other cognitive faculties, such as reasoning, memory, creativity, language, perception, judgment, and thinking. It is paramount to our ability to adapt to life in the world, as it informs both our other cognitive faculties and our executive functions, namely: decision-making, strategizing, and problem-solving in general. It was a slight alteration in our neural algorithms that allowed us to shape the world in the light of our imagination, propelling the species on its unstoppable trajectory, tells us cognitive neuroscientist David Eagleman. Curious, however, that for so long the importance of the role of imagination to the inferential process has been downplayed or neglected. The neglect to look to the imagination as a legitimate object of investigation is because it has been, to a large extent, cut off from reason. Thus, imagination became the cognitive faculty related to the arts, and reason the only suitable for reasoning. Whereas, when we ask ourselves 'what if' we bring a hypothesis to light — and its emergence is to a large extent the result of our imagination for it lies within the realm of imagined possibilities and it is not yet part of the reality of the proven facts — it is the reasoning that allows us to consciously control the inferential process (CP 2.119-218, 1902). It is through reasoning, which is fed back by the imagination itself, that we can transform a hypothesis into justified knowledge. The purpose of this communication is to emphasize C. S. Peirce's perspective on imagination and highlight how he demonstrated that imagining is an action proper of thought that informs and sometimes even guides our rationality. To accomplish this, I will recall the following authors: C. S. Peirce, Susan Haack, Jim Davies, and David Eagleman.

Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle | PUC-SP, Brazil

Analysis of the Epistemic and Heuristic Character of Metaphors in Light of C. S. Peirce’s Theory of Semiotics and Pragmatism

In current literature, metaphor is treated as either an instance of implicit comparison or as a non-literal class-inclusion statement. While philosophers agree that patent falsity is the usual case with metaphors in their literal interpretation, they disagree on their propositional character. Both approaches to metaphor are consistent with the respective theories of meaning on which they are based and persuasive in their respective scope. I will argue that, contrary to these positions, the notions of comparison and class-inclusion are not mutually exclusive in character but rather complementary cognitive concepts which entail one another. This synthesis presupposes that we consider as acceptable the existence of a life cycle for these tropes. I will argue that the juxtaposition of the notion of literal meaning and the notion of metaphorical meaning as an exclusive disjunction is misguided in as much as both play a significant role within the same life-cycle of a metaphor and where both constitute an integral part of a dynamic system that comprises the literal as well as the figurative meaning of these tropes. I will argue that one of the purposes of metaphor is the accommodation of natural language to a world in transformation which allows us to think about new things despite the inherent limits of our linguistic resources. The most prominent reasons for resorting to the extraordinary, that is, metaphorical use of language may be found in both education, where metaphor serves a heuristic, as well as in scientific activities, where these tropes fulfill an epistemic purpose in as much as they render comprehensible the acquisition of radically new knowledge. In the course of my argument, I will use Peirce’s theoretical precepts of Pragmatism and Semiotics in order to explain metaphor as a semantic displacement from both an epistemic as well as from a heuristic point of view.
 

Communications session 7

Semiotics and Society

Johnny Marques de Jesus | PUC-SP, Brazil

Pragmatic Semiosis of Deliberative Democracy

In this work, I intend to investigate the nature of public deliberative dynamics in terms of pragmatic semiosis. I start with Misak's application of Peircean pragmatism to deliberative democracy. The epistemology of democratic discourse is based, therefore, on a social learning process of conflict resolution mediated discursively by a fallibilist research community. In communicative action, public deliberation, starting, via Rawls, from discursive and procedural conditions of equality, freedom and reasonableness/rationality (of the moral person) described in the Original Position, develops mutual understanding through the game of arguments and counterarguments, counterbalancing public reasons for building the reflective balance of a public and reviewable agreement on principles and norms of social cooperation. The truth or validity of the mutual agreement results from the democratic force of the best argument. On the other hand, Frank Fischer, as well as Michael E. Morrell, emphasize that affective-moral processes are fundamental elements that make up the dynamics of democratic discourse, together with argumentative public deliberation (and its correlated discourse ethics). Aiming to analyze the principles of such dynamics of democratic discourse, according to its systemically unified cognitive and affective-moral composition, I will try to correlate the epistemology of the public deliberative community with the tensive semiotics of Zilberberg and Fontanille, according to the theory of emergent semiosis proposed by El-Hani & Queiroz (2005). Thus, the dynamics of reflective equilibrium of democratic discourse will be conceived as a dialogue-based (Linell, Walton) emerging semiosis of an mutual agreement, understood as a logical space of convergent, fallible and argumentatively justifiable public reasons, and also as an intensive and extensive space of valences immanent to the temporality of discourses, both spaces constituting a logical-tensive social space-time, which suports the bounded rational choice process (cf. "bounded rationality" and "bounded social decision-making") about the principles and norms of cooperation social (so I do not start from the theory of rational choice that operates in Rawls' Original Position). Rescher (2017) has an appropriate term to characterize this balance of democratic semiosis: evaluative complementarity processed in rational choice, from a resolution of aspectival tensions.

Eliane Aparecida Dorico Washington | PUC-SP, Brazil

The Importance of Peircean Semiotics for the Process of Impact on Positive Law and its Syntactic, Semantic and Pragmatic Dimensions

For the purposes of this work, semiotics will be used to study the incidence on three “dimensions”. To simplify the three branches of semiotics established by Peirce (general theory of signs, critical logic and methodeutics), the well-known divisions established by Charles Morris between Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics will be used. Morris' divisions maintain an analogy with the relationship between Sign, Object and Interpretant. Thus, Syntax, or syntactic dimension of semiosis, which would be the relationship between signs - here we will use the term “implies”; Semantics, or semantic dimension of semiosis, which would be the relations of signs to objects to which signs apply - here we will use the terms designates and “denotes”; and Pragmatics, in which the object of study may be the relationship between signs and interpreters, this relationship will be called pragmatic dimension of semiosis - in this case, we will use the term “expresses”. It is up to syntax to study the relationship of signs among themselves, deprived of their respective meanings. In the Positive Law system, syntax occurs through the relationship of norms to each other. Semantics also gives meaning to statements, however, from the perspective of the relationship of signs with the objects they represent. This is where the problems of vagueness and ambiguity can be alleviated; in Law, it is the field of meanings. Under the pragmatic dimension, the incidence takes place in two operations: the interpretation and the constitution of the new legal language. Analyzing the incidence under the linguistic-semiotic aspect enables, in a way, the organization of knowledge, in addition to confirming that only through human intervention can language occur, through which ideals and their externalization are guaranteed, thus enabling that the norm may be applied. Thus, the primary function of the legal standard is to focus on the facts of life in society in order to legalize, transforming into a legal fact the part that is important in its factual support and making the legal standard mandatory.
 

Dionisio Moreno Ferres | PUC-SP, Brazil

The Adaptability of Behavior

The work addresses adaptability as an inducer of behaviors known as habits for the survival of living beings. Its interactions with the world and its striking characteristics are repetitive or redundancy results that materialize survival habits.  With this we want to demonstrate that the acquisition of habits results from the continuous temporal interaction of the past and the future in space and that the present is non-existent, because it is always referred to in the past as memory and projected to the future as a possibility of permanence. With that the present becomes a continuous mutation.
 
 

Gabriel Engel Ducatti; Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez | Unesp - Marília, Brazil

Digital Effects on Conduct: An Investigation in the Light of Pragmatism

Inspired by Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim, this work is intended to outline a possible pragmatist characterization of the notion of “digital”. In a way, the digital world is what made it possible and has been making it possible that, in the current context of pandemics, some human relations could remain at a distance. We've never been so interconnected, but the fact that such connections are digital doesn't seem to stop the feeling of loneliness from appearing. However, despite its current usage, this term is not always expressed in a philosophically satisfactory way; there are both technical definitions, which link this notion to the idea of binary digits, and common-sense definitions, which, for example, conceive the digital in contrast to the physical. We are not here denying such characterizations, on the contrary, we apprehend them as ways of expression of the concept. What we seek to emphasize is the growing centrality of the digital for the promulgation of contemporary human relations and, in this context, we propose to outline a characterization of the term in light of the Peircean guiding principle of scientific conduct. This maxim, which began to be elaborated by Peirce in 1878 and continued to be elaborated until at least 1905, arose in order to establish experimental verification criteria for the clarification of concepts. In this sense, Peirce suggests that we consider the effects that the object of our conception can conceivably have on conduct, so that the conception of these effects is the conception of the object. Starting from a philosophical-interdisciplinary analysis around the digital, and considering that digital interactions sometimes may not be enough in face of the human need to relate (in a non-digital sense), we propose: at first, to elaborate a brief synthesis of some pragmatist assumptions; present some characterizations of the term digital; at the end, to suggest, provisionally and open to discussion, an interpretation of the term in light of the pragmatist maxim. The problems that will guide our reflection can be stated as follows: (1) What pragmatic consequences can be drawn when trying to clarify the concept of digital? And (2) the internet and digital networks have made us isolating ourselves, getting more and more alone, or we are getting more and more alone, isolating ourselves, and the internet and digital media have taken advantage of this to fill "spaces" and “times” of our day to day? Adopting fallibilism, we will discuss these questions in order to outline provisional hypotheses, without the pretense of providing ready and definitive answers.
 
 

Communications session 8

Logic and Pragmatism

Sarah Lindsay Button de Oliveira Ferreira | UFG, Brazil

The Instrumentalization of Language Through Communication: Limits of Sentence Form

From a pragmatic point of view, it is common to conceive language through the relationship it has with its users. In this sense, there is a semantics characterized as a theory of communication in which there is a common objective content between speakers on which they can agree or disagree, that is, for there to be communication, it is essential to know that the speakers in question speak about “the same subject”. Traditionally in language, among the components of sentences, the singular term that will be responsible for indicating the common theme in a dialogue: “what are we talking about?”, referring to the intended object. Thus, the concept of object identification, from the perspective of communication theory, presupposes epistemological structures in the pre-linguistic structure, as it will require the interlocutor to have the ability to identify for himself the object intended in the locution. However, it is not clear whether the identity of the named objects is fully available, as it is not clear how we refer to this object outside the epistemological structure of spacetime, such as the case of numbers as mathematical objects. This tendency to object-oriented, which a semantics characterized by the theory of communication underlies a problem: the instrumentalization of language as a communication tool. In which a common ground between the interlocutors is sought, if an interlocutor can communicate to another which object he refers to through a singular term, that is, they presuppose, without further clarification, the reference to objects through singular terms. Within the philosophy of language, this issue touches the identity statements, since the identification "for oneself", that is, assuming epistemological structures, does not seem to be articulated in identity statements where two singular terms are for the same object, since there is no longer any guarantee that interlocutors can no longer identify a common ground of interlocution by employing a single singular term that refers to the intended object. How then is the meaning of singular terms established? A large part of this problem resides in a literature of analytic philosophy that limits itself to the form of sentences as a minimal unit of communication. In this sense, the instrumentalization of language as a communication tool, pragmatics overcomes this limitation and raises the question of whether the formalization of non-linguistic experiences makes sense. To map this issue, we will use Ernst Tugendhat's analytic lessons of language.
 
 

Renan Henrique Baggio | PUC-SP, Brazil

The Post-Truth in Peirce's Eyes: Towards a Realistic Rescue of this Muddle

With the growing and unrestrained use of networks, the transmission of digital content reaches unimaginable proportions. Along with this new communicational panorama, the limits of the credible, as well as the precise demarcation between the true and the false, are overshadowed by the partiality of the receivers who no longer base their certainties through investigation, but through the immediate and saturated transmission of content. In this scenario, the filter bubbles, through the action of algorithms, guide network users based on the preferences demonstrated through their virtual conduct. Still, the strong influence of the infamous fake news is notable, which provide for the maintenance of previously established beliefs. These factors combined make the “post-truth empire” erect, in which the notion of truth, even if it exists, has no relevance whatsoever in the analysis of facts. Given the possible epistemological consequences that such positioning presents, this work aims to reaffirm the conceptions of reality and truth found in the thought of Charles S. Peirce and, furthermore, to show how the notion of post-truth negates or subverts at least four fundamental aspects of Peircean realism, namely: a) alterity and permanence of the real; b) the long run principle; c) the fallibilist possibility of error; and d) the idea of truth as something public. Therefore, we can affirm that the post-truth is nothing more than a seductive illusion, whose pragmatic bases are reduced to a mere “make-believe”. To go through our objective, we will start with a characterization of the post-truth, basing its action on the dynamics of filter bubbles and fake news, as well as on the transmission of beliefs by contagion, that is, in an immediate and saturated way through the networks. Once this is done, we will approach Peircean realism to seek in its scope the foundation for the notion of real and, consequently, the criteria for truth. From this approach, we will reach the four points mentioned above and through them, we will argue that the post-truth either denies them, or subverts them, but in doing so, compromises the reach of their narratives that, sometimes, bump into the harshness of the facts and they succumb to the very reality they sought to ignore.
 
 

Lucas Antonio Saran | PUC-SP, Brazil

The Influence of James and Dewey on Russell's Neutral Monism

From the presentation of On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean, Bertrand Russell started nearing more and more of a kind of philosophy that the English philosopher called "neutral monism". In that context, it came to exist, to Russell, more relevance in James and Dewey’s thoughts. Thus, the goal of this paper is to verify how big the influence of James and Dewey is on the building of Russell's monism. In order to achieve that goal, this work Will be divided in two chapters: the first chapter will present the main characteristics of Russell's philosophy (concerning to neutral monism); the second chapter will analyse the possible influences of James and Dewey on Russell's thought. It is important noticing that, in this situation, the influence of James (on Russell) looks more prominent: Russell, criticizning or analyzing the "radical empiricism" (which pragmatists call the "neutral monism"), tends to assign such "empiricism" to James. In spite of that, the English philosopher, talking about "neutral monism" in the famous lectures on logical atomism (1918), quotes the Essays in experimental logic (from Dewey) too. In line with that, this researching will insist on looking for connections between Russel and Dewey without forgetting the importance of James; In the mentioned work, Dewey really talks about a kind of sure related with things like instinct and habit. That way of thought looks very close to Russell's reflections on habits linked to words's apprenticeship (in The Analysis of Mind). Of course, it is not possible to identify perfectly Russell in an approach with Dewey's (nor even James's), but, surely, it is very interesting to perceive the walking of such approach to a set of philosophical theses more and more pragmatists: Russell probably preserves the Project of a philosophy grounded on the analysis, and on the need of rebuilding and eliminating some kinds of entities; however, some parts of that project are changed and weakened.
 
 

Rogério Bettin | PUC-SP, Brazil

Between Clouds and Clocks: Determinism and Indeterminism in Peirce and Popper

This work aims to analyze the concepts of determinism and indeterminism in Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper, seeking to start from the main epistemological and ontological assumptions of these authors, from which it is intended to show that two conceptions of the world are derived, both free from the classical determinism inherited from the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. Such conceptions follow a current view of science that, in the beginning of the 20th century, incorporated the probabilistic character in its theories and ontologically adopted the natural principle of chance. The work also intends to show, not only the proximity between the two authors under the general focus of the idea of ​​indeterminism, but emphasizes that both thinkers present a new paradigm for the scientific method; fallibility in Charles Sanders Peirce and falsificationism in Karl Popper, such theories confirm and justify the epistemological position in favor of the physical indeterminism of these thinkers, arguing that there are no absolute truths and certainties.  Importantly, the key text that inspires this work is the essay “On Clouds and Clocks” which was presented by Karl Popper at a lecture in memory of Arthur Holly Compton presented at the University of Washington in 1965 and was published in 1972 in a chapter of work “Objective Knowledge”. In this conference Karl Popper to explain determinism and indeterminism presents an analogy “Of clouds and clocks”, as well as in this conference Karl Popper writes that Charles Sanders Peirce was the first physicist and philosopher after the success of the Newtonian theory to contest determinism and defend the position of physical indeterminism. In this regard, we can observe that the American physicist and philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, did not agree with the trend or scientific belief of his time, with the physical determinism being almost unanimous among philosophers and physicists in this period.  Thus, we can observe the indeterminism in Charles Sanders Peirce who, even contradicting the scientific belief of his period, understood that all clocks and however accurate they might be, there would be some degree of clouding in these clocks.